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ABSTRACT

The Growing Middle Class and the Absence of Democracy in China
by
Danni Mei

Advisor: Forrest Colburn

Contrary to the prediction of modernization theory, the vibrant Chinese economy and its
growing middle class have not brought democratic change to the authoritarian country. This
work sheds light on the puzzle of the absence of democracy in China despite a fast-growing
middle class. The study argues that the key to explaining the middle class’ inert political
behavior is to be found in its fragmentation. It is necessary to disaggregate the political,
economic, and social positions of different subgroups of the Chinese middle class—government
officials and party cadres, private entrepreneurs of small or medium businesses, professionals,
and white-collar employees—and the tension among these subgroups. These groups have
different interests and so different attitudes toward democratic change. Moreover, the state has
astute ways of managing these middle-class subgroups, and that, too, plays an important role in
hindering political activity.
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Beginning in 1978, China implemented economic reforms to revive and modernize its economy,
which was severely disrupted during the Cultural Revolution. With its economic reforms, China
transformed itself from a country with a backward planned economy into one of the major
economic powers of the world. According to a 2018 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report,
China is the world’s second largest economy with a nominal gross domestic product (GDP) of
$13.5 trillion and the world’s largest economy by purchasing power parity. Along with its
remarkable economic development, Chinese society has undergone a significant transformation as
well. In the increasingly modernized society, a new middle class has emerged as a prominent
socioeconomic force. Observing these changes in China, scholars have long wondered if there
would be ensuing democratic changes because, according to the deeply influential modernization
theory, economic development and democracy are closely related. As Seymour Martin Lipset
stated, “All the various aspects of economic development—industrialization, urbanization, wealth
and education—are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political
correlate of democracy” (Lipset 1960: 41). However, apart from a failed attempt of
democratization in 1989, the Chinese society has not experienced major democratic evolution, and
China remains an authoritarian country. It is a puzzle why economic growth and a growing middle
class have not ushered in political change.
After reviewing the general literature on the correlation between the middle class,
especially the Chinese middle class, and democratization, some important questions present
themselves: Does modernization theory apply to a late-developing, authoritarian country such as
China? What is the explanation for the absence of democratization in China despite significant
economic development? What role does the Chinese middle class play in the non-existence of
democratization in China? The answers to these three questions are directly connected with the
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understanding of the interactive dynamics between economic development and political
democratization, and of the middle class’ political attitude toward democratization. However,
scholars share no clear consensus about the correlation between economic development and the
middle class’ support for democratic change. Moreover, most of the studies on middle class and
democratization deem the middle class as an aggregate without systematically analyzing the
nuanced layers of the middle class and distinguishing different subgroups and their distinct stance
on Chinese politics.
To further the study on the middle class and democratization, and shed light on the puzzle
of the absence of democratization in an economically developed China, this study uses the
theoretical literature on the middle class and politics as intellectual guidance, and examines the
case of the Chinese middle class. The study also analyzes the political, economic, and social
positions of different subgroups of the middle class—government officials and party cadres,
private entrepreneurs of small or medium businesses, professionals, and white-collar employees—
and the tension among these subgroups, and explains their different attitudes toward potential
democratic change. Based on empirical evidence found from multiple sources, including academic
literature and information from newspapers and magazines, this work argues that the middle class
in China is fragmented and does not have a consensus on democratization. Above all, what
contributes to the lack of middle-class consensus in China is the attitude of subgroups that are
dependent on the state. The astute ways in which the authoritarian state manages middle-class
subgroups also plays an important role in hindering the formation of the consensus.
The first part of the study reviews the theoretical literature on the middle class and
democratization, and the literature exploring the correlation between the Chinese middle class and
China’s potential democratization. The second part of the work examines the formation of the
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Chinese middle class from a historical point of view. It discusses the political, economic, and social
context in which the Chinese middle class was born. Moreover, the study explains the ways in
which the middle class is defined and gives its definition of the class. The third part of the study
analyzes subgroups of the Chinese middle class, their different interests and relations with the state,
and the tension among these subgroups. The work also elaborates on what hinders the Chinese
middle class from forming a consensus on democratization and under which circumstances a
consensus can be formed. The last part of the study summarizes the arguments made, examines
the prospect of the Chinese middle class and democratization, and discusses the implications of
the study for theorizing about the middle class.
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW

Theories on the Middle Class and Democratization
There is a large body of literature that discusses topics such as the correlation between the middle
class and democratization, the middle class’ attitude toward democracy, and the role of the middle
class during democratic change. Scholars hold different views. However, there are two major
perspectives on the dynamics between the middle class and democratization.
The first perspective contends that socioeconomic modernization leads to an expansive and
more liberal middle class, which, in turn, usually show strong support for democracy and plays an
important role in propelling democratization. Lipset’s (1961) modernization theory is the epitome
of this perspective. According to Lipset, socioeconomic development led to the growth of middle
class in the democratic countries of Western Europe. Strong democratic countries have strong
economies and a large middle class with more purchasing power. Weak and authoritarian states
tend to have weak economies and a small middle class with less purchasing power. Therefore, a
modernization process is closely related to the rise of a liberal middle class and a democratic
political system. Lipset also identifies various preconditions of modernization and democratization,
which include industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education. These conditions are closely
related as one major force that leads up to democratic change. To Lipset, the correlation between
economic development and democratization is inexorable. However, his theory cannot explain the
absence of democracy in China and in other developing countries that have a fast-growing
economy.
Agreeing with Lipset’s theory, Diamond (2008) addresses the positive impact of economic
development on democratization from a socio-behavioral point of view. He contends that as a
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country becomes wealthier, more industrialized, urban, and better educated, public values in a
society becomes more conducive to democracy. Moreover, people have higher income and become
more informative: “They become more politically aware and confident, more inclined to
participate in politics, to think for themselves, and thus to break free of traditional patron–client
ties” (99).
In the same vein, Huntington (1991) shows the impact of modernization on
democratization in Asian states that were experiencing rapid economic growth from 1974 to 1990.
He puts emphasis on the predominant economic conditions that led to democratization. In his study,
Huntington contends that continuing economic development and a growing middle class
undermined authoritarian regimes, which caused these regimes to either choose liberalization or
repress democratization. Differing from Lipset, Huntington does not see democratization as an
inevitable result of economic development. “An overall correlation exists between the level of
economic development and democracy, yet no level or pattern of economic development is in itself
either necessary or sufficient to bring about democratization” (59). To Huntington, the relation
between economic development and democratization is complex and may change due to temporal
and spatial factors. However, he believes the significant impact of economic development on
democratization in those Asian states.
Concurring with Huntington’s view, Hattori, Funatsu, and Torii’s (2003) study of the
emergence of the Asian middle class and their characteristics makes the same observation. They
argue that when a society is undergoing modernization, its citizens’ income, education, social
mobility, appreciation of freedom grow simultaneously. All these changes, in turn, propel a
transition to democracy. They believe that the rising middle class embodies these pro-democracy
changes, and that it is the “main thrust of the democratization movement” (129–30).
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A second perspective about the political role of the middle class argues that there is a
dynamic interaction between economic development and democratization, and that
“democratization is not a natural result of economic growth, it is a political process fraught with
conflict, negotiations, and occasionally setbacks” (Dickson 2003: 12). In this line of theory, the
middle class’ support for democratization is conditional and dependent on certain important
economic and political conditions in a given society. Moreover, studies along this line focus more
on the interactive dynamics between the middle class and other classes in a society, which also
shape the possibility of democratization in a country.
The most prominent study of this perspective is Moore’s (1966) structuralist theory. Using
different cases, Moore analyzes the dynamic structures of power in different countries that were
conducive to democratization and sees the middle class as a potential force for democratic
transformation and an intervening variable. He famously states, “No bourgeoisie, no democracy”
(418). Moore also emphasizes the important role of the middle class’ alliance with other social
groups during a democratic transformation. Furthermore, Moore identifies conditions that
contributed to the bourgeois revolutions. He argues that the landowners and bourgeoisie should be
both strong and independent enough to limit the arbitrary powers of the aristocracy through
regulations and other means, which put constraints on kings as well as gain more rights and wealth.
It was also important that the coalition be against the aristocracy and not the peasant and worker,
or it would be unfavorable to democracy. Moore’s study laid the ground for a structuralist theory
and inspired many later studies on the middle class and democracy.
Drawing upon Moore’s theory, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) propose a
class-structural model and emphasize the importance of social class in democratization. They
create a “relative class power” model of democratization and perceive social class as the “master
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key” (5) that defines the chance for coalition. They studied South American societies and
distinguished social classes that were important in determining the regime type of a country:
working class, rural and urban middle class, landlord class, and bourgeoisie. They see different
types of capitalist development as the determinant of the structure of class power in a country,
which directly results in a certain type of regime. To them, state power and transnational power do
not have a steady impact on the type of regime. As they put it, “[Capitalist development] is
associated with democracy because it transforms the class structure, strengthening the working
and middle classes and weakening the landed upper class” (7). Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and
Stephens argue that the contradictory nature of capitalism advanced the cause of democracy and
analyze the tension and interplay among social classes including the middle class. This kind of indepth social class analysis can certainly be applied to the Chinese case.
In terms of the prominent economic and political conditions that affect the middle class’
support for democratization, scholars of this line of research believe that because of the variation
of these conditions in late-developing countries, the middle class’ support for democratization also
varies from country to country. According to Chen and Lu (2011), these conditions includes “the
middle class’ dependence on the state, its perceived socioeconomic well-being, its political
alliance with other classes (e.g., upper and working class), its own cohesiveness (or fragmentation),
and its fear of political instability” (706). Numerous studies, especially studies on developing
country that are experiencing significant economic changes, provide empirical evidence for this
argument. Examples include Koo’s (1991) study on South Korea, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and
Stephens’s (1992) study on South Africa, Bertrand’s (1998) study on Southeast Asia, Jones’s
(1998) study on Pacific Asia, and Englehart’s (2003) study on Thailand. According to these studies,
when the middle class’ dependence on the authoritarian state is strong, its socioeconomic status is
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less prominent, its alliance is with the elite, its structure is more fragmented, and its fear of political
instability is pronounced, the middle class is less likely to support democratization. When these
conditions change, the middle class in an authoritarian society may also change its attitude toward
democratization. Given the middle class’ conditional attitude toward democratization, some
scholar even goes on to say that “it would not make much sense…to characterize [the middle class]
as progressive or conservative” (Koo 1991: 506). However, born in the process of capitalist
development, the middle class undeniably shares some intrinsic values with democracy, which is
also given birth by economic growth. As a result, it makes more sense to perceive the existence of
certain economic and political conditions as inhibitors of the middle class’ support for democracy.
A few scholars pay attention to the fragmentation of the middle class and contend that
because different subgroups of the middle class are not equally positioned in an authoritarian
system, they may adopt different attitude toward democratization. Koo (1991) mentioned in his
study that the different segments of the middle class respond to democratic change differently. As
he specifies, “The transition from authoritarian rule is composed of a series of different ‘moments’
or conjunctures, each of which raises different issues, a different form of conflicts, and a shifting
balance of power among classes” (486). Therefore, different classes in the society respond
differently, so do the different segments of the middle class. The same observation is made by Gill
(1998). He suggests that the different strata of the middle class “can have different and sometimes
conflicting interests and may act in widely divergent ways to protect those interests” (308). As a
result, as Gontmakher and Ross (2015) put it, “Distinguishing the different groupings which exist
within the middle class and analyzing their value is thus as important as distinguishing the values
of different classes” (273).
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The first perspective of linking modernization, economic development, and the growth of
the middle class with the middle class’ support for democracy and democratization is optimistic.
However, it cannot provide a sufficiently convincing explanation for the absence of
democratization in China and other late-developing, authoritarian countries. The second
perspective is more sober—and more useful. It can better explain why democratization happened
or did not happen in countries at different stages of development.
In developing countries, the middle class has shown various attitudes toward
democratization. It may support democratization, or it may back authoritarian regimes based on
specific social, economic, and political contexts. The second perspective is a more effective
framework to analyze the correlation between the middle class and democratization in developing
countries such as China. Especially useful in this literature is the emphasis on the fragmentation
of the middle class. An appreciation for the nuances of the middle class can seemingly help explain
the potential for democratic change. This study agrees with the view that the middle class plays an
important role in democratic transformation, but proposes that the Chinese middle class is not
necessarily prone to democratic change. The Chinese middle class is complex, and it is fragmented.
Different subgroups of the middle class respond differently to political and economic factors.
Context is important in Chinese politics.

Studies on the Chinese Middle Class and Democratization
Many scholars have explored the correlation between the Chinese middle class and potential
democratization in China. They reach different conclusions on whether the Chinese middle class
supports democracy or the authoritarian regime. There are two prominent views in this body of
literature.
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The first view is that the Chinese middle class, like the Western middle class, embraces
many liberal values and is in favor of democratic change. However, whether the middle class will
move to support democratic values is still unclear. Chen and Lu (2006) conducted a representativesample survey in Beijing, and the result shows that the Chinese middle class expressed their
preference for a more democratically organized grassroots self-government—a civic
administrative unit under the control of the communist party—and their willingness to participate
in public affairs. Tang, Woods, and Zhao’s (2009) study on the attitudes of Chinese middle class
is based on the dataset from Asian Barometer Survey. They conclude that China’s middle class
showed higher democratic orientation than the Chinese lower class when the class is defined by
occupation or self-identification. As they state, “Compared to farmers, workers, and the
unemployed, those people who are managers, professionals, private entrepreneurs, or high-salary
white-color workers show higher affection towards democracy” (90). Specifically speaking, the
middle class showed stronger civic values, favoring attitude toward democratic political
procedures, and dislike for unchecked power of the authoritarian regime. They posit that it was the
new life experience of new professions that increased people’s understanding of modern
democratic values.
Tang (2011) examines the characteristics of the rising Chinese middle class by using
dataset from Asian Barometer Survey. The study shows that in comparison to other social classes,
the Chinese middle class showed a higher interest in politics and participated more in “personal
activities in dealing with conflicts with government policies and officials” (373). Nevertheless, the
middle class as a group did not exhibit any remarkable difference from other classes in political
activities in confronting the authoritarian state. Therefore, Tang believes that the Chinese middle
class is not ready to be an active force in the political development in China.
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The second view is that the Chinese middle class may have adopted certain democratic
values, but it is, in fact, in favor of the current authoritarian system and fears political instability.
In her study, Pearson (1997) poses the research question: do economic reforms inevitably lead to
political change? Her research is based on 51 in-depth interviews conducted in 1991 and 1995 with
Chinese working in managerial positions in the foreign sector. She argues that China’s emerging
business elites developed new types of relations with the state, from which a democratic/liberal
pattern can be observed. She suggests that these business elites enjoyed more autonomy in
comparison to other social groups. If they fail to convert their economic interests to political
influence, then other groups are even less likely to be able to do so. Therefore, she believes that
they were an important social group in deciding China’s political future. Since the relations
between this group and the state shifted toward clientelism and socialist corporatism, business
elites did not choose to support the concept of democratization. Therefore, economic reforms and
the ensuing economic growth did not result in democratization.
Similar to Pearson’s study, Chen and Dickson’s (2008) study explores the reasons and
degree of Chinese private entrepreneurs’ support for the existing authoritarian system by
conducting a survey of private entrepreneurs in five coastal provinces. From the data collected in
the survey, they contend that Chinese private entrepreneurs have a tendency to support the current
political system and prefer the status quo to fundamental change. According to the authors, several
critical factors influenced these private entrepreneurs’ favoring attitude toward the authoritarian
regime, including “democratic values, life satisfaction, evaluation of government policy
performance, and perception of official corruption” (780). In addition, they argue that the closer
the ties that the private entrepreneurs have to the state, the more supportive they are regarding the
authoritarian regime and the status quo.
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From a sociological point of view, Tomba (2009) focuses his study on professionals and
public employees in China. He argues that the significant economic status enhancement happened
in the late 1990s for salaried Chinese professionals and public employees was not because of the
market or the growing economy. He contends that their elevated status was engineered by the
reformist state to boost consumer spending, simulate economic growth, promote social and
political stability, and enhance the efficiency of the bureaucracy. As the “winner” picked by the
state, these professionals and public employees received raised salaries and improved working
conditions, and they benefited from redistribution of public assets, especially of housing. These
policies favored social groups in the urban areas that have close ties to the state. Apart from the
economic consideration of the state, Tomba points out, creating a middle class—an exemplary
class—can also help the state to maintain its legitimacy and authority. The middle class’ interests
are intertwined with the state interests, and its privileged status increases its fear of political
instability and the lower class. As a result, the Chinese middle class is more of a force for social
stability than an agent of political change.
In the same vein, Chen and Lu (2011) base their research on data collected from their
probability-sample survey conducted on urban population in three cities. They analyze respondents’
rights consciousness, valuation of political liberty versus order, support for participatory norm,
and support for competitive election. They conclude that the Chinese middle class’ support for
democratization in authoritarian countries is contingent on many social, economic, and political
conditions. They also contend that the more the Chinese middle class depends on the state, the less
it would support democratization. In addition, when the middle class perceive a good prospect in
the authoritarian country, it would tend to be less supportive of democratization.
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Based on empirical evidence from previous studies, Nathan’s (2016) study explore the
reason why Lipset’s modernization cannot explain the current situation in China and why the
Chinese middle class is not yet a supportive force for democratization. He argues that there are
four differences between the Chinese middle class and Lipset’s middle class. First, the Chinese
middle class only accounts for a small percentage of the population. Second, the Chinese middle
class has a different nature of employment, and those in the middle class are mostly employees of
state-controlled organizations. Third, the Chinese middle class is new. It only reemerged four
decades ago and began its rapid growth three decades ago. The Chinese middle class only started
to forge a way of life and have little shared perceptions or interests. Nathan explains, “For an
established middle class, wealth is a spur to political participation; for a new middle class, political
participation is a distraction” (11). Fourth, the Chinese middle class does not have a rich
associational life common in the Western middle class. The government forbids organizations that
may compete with top-down youth, women’s, and labor associations, and it also impedes the
growth of independent media and heavily regulate the internet. Though having some features
related to support for democratization, the Chinese middle class today, Nathan believes, has too
many fears, and that is why while it has more democratic values, it still supports an authoritarian
state.
Both views of the Chinese middle class and democratization are supported by certain
empirical evidence from the aforementioned studies. However, these empirical studies have their
limits and cannot be deemed as definitive because most of them are based on a sample that has
limited representation. Nevertheless, these studies shed light on the puzzle of why China is not
democratized when there are remarkable economic development and a fast-growing middle class.
Although whether the Chinese middle class supports democracy or the authoritarian state is
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debatable, several other points are clear. As a social class born in the tide of economic reform and
benefitting from modernization and economic growth, the Chinese middle class is prone to
democratic/liberal values. Some social groupings within the middle class are dependent on the
state, benefiting from the status quo, but the middle class as a whole is subject to the rule of the
authoritarian state and under its control. The middle class’ wealth and social status can be easily
affected by the authoritarian state’s policies, and its liberal values are limited by the nondemocratic reality and fear.
Drawing on these conclusions, this study will further explain the absence of
democratization in China and specify the Chinese middle class’ stance on democratic change.
Based on empirical evidence from multiple sources, the study will distinguish different subgroups
of the Chinese middle class, analyze their various relations with the authoritarian state, the benefit
and/or punishment that they may receive from the state, and the tensions among themselves. The
study explains how the different interests of these subgroups and their different relations with the
state hinder the middle class as a whole from achieving consensus and creating a momentum for
democratic change. The study will also discuss why the attitude of subgroups that are dependent
on the state is crucial to forming a political consensus and advancing democratic change.
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II. THE CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS EXPLAINED

The Formation of the Chinese Middle Class
The Chinese society experienced a period of instability after the end of Qing Dynasty in 1912.
Between the late 1920s and 1930s, some military-related industrial sectors were developed in
preparation for war with Japan. Moreover, in the Republican era (1912–1949), according to Chow
(2007), “In spite of political instability, economic activities carried on and economic development
took place between 1911 and 1937,” and he concludes, “modernization was taking place” (20–21).
During this period, China had a well-functioning market economy, which laid foundation for
China’s return to a market economy after its economic reform in the late 1970s. The growth of
national capitalism gave birth to factories and workers in major cities, and thus, the Chinese society
underwent some significant structural changes.
Chen (2013) distinguished two sectors in the pre-1949 Chinese society: an urban sector
and a rural sector. In the rural sector, there was “the dominance of a small number of gentry and
landowners over the large number of landless peasants” (46). In the urban sector, there was “the
dominance of a small number of upper-class bourgeoisie and comprador capitalists over a large
number of urban proletariat” (46). In Mao Zedong’s (1977) well-known essay “Analysis of the
Classes in Chinese Society,” he also discusses different components of the 1920s’ Chinese society
and distinguishes five classes, some of which can be further divided into subgroups. These classes
were: (1) the landlord class and the comprador class, (2) the middle bourgeoisie, (3) the petty
bourgeoisie, (4) the semi-proletariat, and (5) the proletariat. According to Mao, the petty
bourgeoisie class included the owner-peasants, the master handicraftsmen, and the lower levels of
the intellectuals, to be specific, students, primary and secondary school teachers, lower
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government functionaries, office clerks, small lawyers, and petty traders. This category clearly
paints a picture of the early Chinese middle class. Based on previous studies, Chen estimates that
the early Chinese middle class accounted for about only three percent of the population right before
1949. Despite of its small size, this gradually rising class had certain degree of economic and
political independence and forged a life style of their own.
In 1949, China ended its civil war with the retreat of the Republic of China to Taiwan and
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. The new communist government, under the
guidance of the orthodox Marxist ideology, had a mission of eliminating class differences and
creating “a classless and equal society” (Chen 2013: 47). Therefore, soon after the party took
power, it pushed through reforms to eradicate the economic foundations for private economy in
order to achieve the destratification of social classes. In the land reform in the rural China, the
party confiscated wealth and land from landlords and redistributed them to peasants.
In urban China, in the 1950s, the party nationalized all large enterprises owned by national
and comprador capitalists, most of which later evolved into state-owned enterprises. To take over
ownership of these enterprises, “the communist state paid capitalists a fixed interest on their capital
until 1966” (Riskin 1991:97). In the same period, the state started “a program of collectivization
of the industrial and commercial enterprises owned by the petite bourgeoisie—the so-called
handicraft industrialists” (Chen 2013: 47). After these reforms, there was no private economy in
China, and almost none of the Chinese people owned private assets. By 1958, the Chinese society
had become almost entirely free of economic basis for class differentiation, and the party-state
took full control over the Chinese economy. All urban citizens were assigned to different types of
work units and had very little occupational mobility. No group of people in China could be
construed as the middle class.
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Under Mao’s class struggle theory, most former capitalists and petty bourgeoisie were
categorized as members of the reactionary class and systematically persecuted. Their offspring
was also included in the same category based on the concept of class origin (Young 1986: 43). In
1966, the party started the Cultural Revolution after Mao claimed that the bourgeoisie had
infiltrated the government and society in the attempt to restore capitalism. During this chaotic
period, former capitalists, business owners, professionals and white-collar employees, and
intellectuals were significantly purged. Most of them suffered brutal “struggle sessions,” and some
of them ended up in prison (Chen 2002: 30–31).
About a decade of political chaos and the zigzags in economic policy during the Cultural
Revolution period resulted in slow economic growth. In 1978, China entered its economic reform
era and started implementing the open-door policy. In this era, the Chinese society experienced a
dramatic change in social stratification. As Chen (2013) states, “While Maoist China was
characterized by the social ‘destratification,’ post-Mao China has seen the gradual return of the
pre-1949 social stratification” (50). Most of the change happened through policies that encouraged
economic privatization. In the early period of economic reform (1978–1983), the party gradually
legitimized the existence of the private sector and allowed individual/small-scale business to be a
supplement to the state and collective sectors. Only in the next stage of reform (1984–1992), the
state started to recognize the legitimacy of private enterprises, which had more employees than
individual/small-scale business. In the ensuing period (1993–present), the state deepened the
reform by taking economic privatization to the next level. After the 1989 pro-democratic
movement, Deng Xiaoping made the decision to continue economic reform and make the transition
to a market-based economy. After Deng’s famous southern tour in 1992, China’s private economy
started to grow at an exponential speed. In 1995, the party carried out its reform of state-owned
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enterprises and implemented a policy— “keep the large ones and let the smaller ones go.” As a
result of this policy, most small- and medium-scale state-owned enterprises were privatized and
became a part of the private sector (Dittmer and Gore 2001). At the same time, the party
encouraged party cadres and government officials to participate in the activities of the private
economy, and by the mid-1990s, “they had become the largest group among private entrepreneurs”
(Chen 2013: 52). In the ensuing decades, the successors of Deng Xiaoping kept following the
reform plan laid out by Deng, and China’s economy made unprecedented progress. In 2017, there
were 65.79 million individually owned businesses and 27.26 million private enterprises in China.
In 2018, the private sector contributed more than 60 percent of China’s GDP growth and created
more than half of its fiscal revenue. In the same year, China’s private economy provided more than
80 percent of jobs and created over 70 percent of technological innovation and new products in
the country (Xinhuanet 2018).
To be noted, the communist party adopted a capitalist economic reform approach because
of the consideration that such an approach is more economically efficient than the old system. It
was political pragmatism, not a fundamental change in ideology. By taking this approach, the
communist party maintained its legitimacy by creating remarkable economic growth. Moreover,
the ruling elite drew lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union, prioritized economic reform,
and left the political reform behind. It was against this backdrop, after two decades of absence, the
Chinese middle class reemerged.

Defining the Contemporary Chinese Middle Class
According to Chen and Lu (2006), there are two approaches in the political science literature in
terms of the conceptualization of the middle class, “subjective approach” and “objective approach”
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(2). The subjective approach deems social class as an individual’s perception of the stratum in the
society that this individual belongs. It is a psychological attachment to a social class, which
influences an individual’s attitude toward politics. The objective approach is defining social class
by certain objective socioeconomic indicators, such as income, education, and occupation. The
objective approach bifurcates into two branches. One branch quantifies those objective indicators.
For example, the quantitative branch puts emphasis on the range of the income of a social class
instead of the sources of income. The other branch is a qualitative branch. It stresses the qualitative
property of the objective indicators, such as different types of occupations.
As an emerging social class in China, the middle class has been expanding since its
reappearance four decades ago, but it is a relatively new and evolving class. People may have
limited understanding of the middle class or even misperception of it. Therefore, people may not
have a shared opinion on what the middle class indicates. As a result, this study takes the objective
approach to defining the Chinese middle class. Both quantitative and qualitative branches are
applied to defining the Chinese middle class in this study. While defining the Chinese middle class
by income level is objective and practical, it alone may fail to acknowledge some particular
features of the Chinese politics and economy. First, there are significant differences between the
urban China and the rural China due to the dualistic development of the country. Apart from
different income and education levels, the urban China and rural China are positioned differently
in the prominent dual economic structure (Xu, Shi and Huang 2014). In the economic reform
period, the party also applied different policies to the urban and rural China. Consequently, the
reemerged Chinese middle-class citizens are mostly the product of urban economy and evolved
during industrialization and modernization in the urban areas. Since there is no significant
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geographic difference in economic and social development among urban areas, this study does not
distinguish middle-class subgroups based on different geographic locations in urban China.
Second, it is necessary to distinguish the various sources of income based on different
occupations because income level alone is not an enough indicator of how an individual is
positioned in a society. In fact, many previous studies on the Chinese middle class have paid
attention to the sources of the middle class’ class status. According to Li (2010), there are three
channels through which individuals can access middle class status: “‘power-based executive
access,’ which includes members of the ruling party, government officials and members of the
civil service; ‘market-driven access,’ which includes private entrepreneurs and managers; and
‘social network access,’ which include professionals and cultural elites” (18). As an effective
indicator of sources of income, occupation can reveal “[social] groupings that are distinct and
separate from one another” (Oppenheimer 1985: 7). Thus, when defining the Chinese middle class,
apart from income level, this study also takes geographic location and occupation into
consideration.
Thus, based on the statistics from a report by Mckinsey & Company, the Chinese middle
class is defined as urban Chinese citizens whose annual incomes range from $13,500 to $53,900
(Barton, Chen, and Jin 2010), and whose family income source is mainly from such occupations
as government officials and party cadres, private entrepreneurs of small or medium business,
professionals, and white-collar employees. There are different sources of data on the Chinese
middle class. Although they may be based on different definitions of the social class, it is helpful
for achieving a more specific understanding of the Chinese middle class to draw the contours of it
with some statistics. The Chinese middle class has an estimated size of 400 million people or 140
million households, which accounts for about one-third of China’s population. Only 4 percent of
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the Chinese urban population was considered middle class in 2000, but the number increased to
more than 30 percent in 2018 (Cyrill 2019). By 2022, 76 percent of the Chinese urban population
will be considered middle class (Barton, Chen, and Jin 2010), and about 100 million Chinese
households will reach an above-upper-middle-class living standard (36Kr 2017).
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III. A FRAGMENTED CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE ABSENCE OF
DEMOCRACY
A Chinese Middle Class without Consensus
After four decades of economic and social development, the Chinese middle class has grown to be
a prominent social group in the today’s Chinese society. Along with other social groups, the
Chinese middle class has experienced rising wealth and education, more access to information,
improved physical mobility, freer lifestyle choices, and other personal freedoms. Many scholars
have commented on this gradual liberalization (Pearson 1997; Chen and Lu 2006; Tang, Woods
and Zhao 2009; Tang 2011; Nathan 2016). However, these remarkable changes did not lead to a
middle class with pronounced pro-democratic support, let alone a middle class acting as a driving
force of democratization.
There are multiple reasons for the political inactivity of the Chinese middle class. It can be
explained by its newness because it may take time for the middle class to find their voice (Nathan
2016). However, in the Chinese case, the middle class’ dependence on the state and its preference
for the status quo are deeper reasons for its lack of democratic support. After all, in the
authoritarian country, the state controls the necessities for economic development, such as
resources and finance, and many members of the middle class have strong ties with the state. In
addition, this dependence is enhanced by the state’s cooptation strategy toward the middle class
(Tang 2011: 375). Moreover, the middle class benefits from the status quo and does not want to
lose its advantageous position by supporting unpredictable political changes. When discussing the
middle class as a homogeneous social group, the above reasons for an inactive middle class are
feasible. Nevertheless, they cannot explain why there is empirical evidence that shows the Chinese
middle class’ expression of favor toward democratic procedures and dislike for unchecked power
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of the authoritarian state (Chen and Lu 2006; Tang, Woods and Zhao 2009; Tang 2011; Pearson
1997). The schizophrenic expression of the middle class’ attitude toward democratization is a
manifestation of its fragmentation and the tension among different subgroups. The Chinese middle
class may have the potential for supporting democratization, but it does not have the cohesion to
reach a consensus.
To explain how the fragmentation of the Chinese middle class prevents it from forming a
consensus on democratization, this part of the study analyzes the fragmented Chinese middle class
by delving into each middle-class subgroup’s state of existence, including their sources of wealth,
relations with the state, relations with other subgroups, and their preferences and fears.
Subsequently, there is a discussion of how the state handles these subgroups, and the middle class
as a whole. Finally, this part of the study explores when democratization might be a favorable
choice for the Chinese middle class by examining the middle class’ attitude in the China of 1989
and the China of 2019.

1. Government Officials and Party Cadres
Government officials and party cadres account for a significant part of the Chinese middle class.
In one study conducted in three large cities in China, this subgroup makes up 60 percent of middleclass respondents (Nathan 2016: 10). Since they have the strongest tie with the party-state and
directly ensure the survival of the authoritarian regime, government officials and party cadres
usually receive generous remuneration from the state. This compensation is especially true after
the second half of 1990s, when the state decided to build a more efficient government by emulating
Singapore and Hong Kong, and adopting a policy of “paying a high salary to foster honesty”
(Tomba 2009: 4). Millions of public servants benefitted from this salary boost, with some even
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received four times of what they used to earn. Apart from high salary, government officials and
party cadres also get special access to inexpensive housing and low-price, high-quality healthcare,
and it is common for them to regularly receive free food, free transport, and other perks (Huanqiu
2012; Jiang 2013).
In addition to these benefits, party officials and party cadres may also get their wealth from
China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Pei (2006) argues that as a neo-Leninist state, China
“blends one-party rule and state control of key sectors of the economy with partial market reforms”
(34). After four decades of development, the state is still deeply entrenched in the economy.
According to government data, in 2008, SOEs held about 30 percent of total assets in the industrial
and service sectors (Xu 2010). The authoritarian state cannot maintain power through coercion
alone. As a result, these firms then serve as “a vast patronage system that secures the loyalty of
supporters and allocates privileges to favored groups” (Pei 2006: 35). In these SOEs, most of the
chief and senior executives are appointed by the party, and members of the party committees in
these enterprises are also members of the boards of directors. Lower-ranking managers and some
staff members of these firms also have dual identities (Cheng 2004: 10). Good performance of
SOEs is favored, but the executives from the party have no mandatory responsibilities to ensure
the efficiency of these enterprises. Corporate debts and bad loans are usually absorbed by the state,
which pays for the debts by using revenue generated by extracting high taxes from private
businesses and Chinese citizens. Employees and the management in SOEs also enjoy high salary
and benefits. Moreover, during the 1995 privatization of SOEs, most small- and medium-scale
SOEs were cheaply sold to the managers of SOEs and became their “first pot of gold” as private
business owners. Apart from these sources of wealth, government officials and SOE managers also
receive the so-called “grey income.” They “often take advantage of their positions to approve
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projects, set prices or influence other deals and then to reap ‘grey income’ in bribes, backhanders
and other forms of corruption” (South China Morning Post 2010), and when the misdeeds are
discovered, some of them only receive “light punishments” (Gidda 2016).
In comparison to other subgroups in the Chinese middle class, government officials and
party cadres enjoy high stability of employment. Since China started embracing market economy,
employment with the state has become the most sought-after “iron rice bowl” to Chinese citizens
because it usually means a job for life with numerous benefits. As a result, young Chinese citizens
favor these jobs because of the job security, competitive salary, and fringe benefits. To obtain these
jobs, people usually need to join the communist party (Nathan 2016: 10). In 2018, 920,000 people
took the national civil service exam, and on average, 63 job applicants competed for one post (Ni
2018).
In the competition for better social status, all contenders are not equal. The offspring of
government officials and party cadres are situated in an advantageous position. They occupied
positions in the government and the military, enjoying political power, and then went into business,
benefitting greatly from the post-Mao market economy because of their strong ties with the state
(Pei 2016: 36). By using their nepotistic connections, the second and even third red generations
can obtain positions “inside the system,” and then they are “riding a rocket” and “promoted rapidly
through government or party ranks to fill positions that, usually, have been vacated by their parents”
(Wang 2013). When the country transformed itself from a planned economy to a market-based
economy, these resourceful offspring used their families’ influence to “buy goods at governmentfixed prices and resell them at the higher market prices” (Wang 2013). Their profiteering caused
public discontent that triggered the 1989 pro-democratic movement. Years later, when China’s
SOEs started to enter the stock market in Hong Kong, these well-connected offspring “landed
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positions at American and European banks where they used their parents’ influence to seek listing
mandates” (Wang 2013).
Clearly, as the major beneficiary of the current authoritarian system, the subgroup of
government officials and party cadres obtained their wealth by using or being close to the public
power. They also have a great advantage in “class regeneration.” Moreover, their privileges and
clientelistic ties with private entrepreneurs create tensions between them and rest of the society.
They have the least motivation in supporting democratization and changing the status quo. Still,
as individuals, they may be influenced by liberal or democratic values. Furthermore, the political
infighting and possible political terror of the authoritarian bureaucratic system may also result in
their support for a more democratic system. For example, the downfall of Bo Xilai and his allies
might remind these government officials and party cadres of the precariousness of politics in an
authoritarian state.

2. Private Entrepreneurs of Small or Medium Businesses
The private sector of the Chinese economy and private entrepreneurs are born in the process of
economic reform led by the state and benefit from the state’s economic policies. After decades of
development, private entrepreneurs have become an indispensable part of the Chinese economy,
contributed greatly toward the country’s high-speed economic growth, and become an important
part of the Chinese middle class.
This part of the middle class has complicated ties with the party-state. Chen and Dickson
(2008) discuss the party-state’s political embeddedness in the private sector, and they examine
private entrepreneurs’ different degrees of affiliation to the party-state. The scholars distinguish
two groups of private entrepreneurs that have close ties with the state. The first group is private
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entrepreneurs who are party members. This groups includes “formerly party and government
officials, state-owned enterprise (SOE) managers, or rank and file members” (788). The second
group is private entrepreneurs who are members of the All-China Federation of Industry and
Commerce (ACFIC), which is a state sponsored association. The state regards this association as
the important institutional connection with private entrepreneurs. In the 1990s, the relations
between private entrepreneurs and the state gradually shifted to clientelism, and thus, private
entrepreneurs became more dependent on the state (Pearson 1997). There are still independent
private entrepreneurs, but they only account for a small portion of this subgroup of the middle
class. Just as dependent private entrepreneurs, these independent private entrepreneurs also have
to develop close ties with officials of the party-state to do business.
In the face of a rising class of private entrepreneurs, the state has taken steps to coopt this
new force in the Chinese society and prevent it from turning into a threat to the authoritarian system.
The party-state adopted two strategies (Dickson 2003): “building institutional linkages with
business associations and recruiting entrepreneurs into the party” (Obukhova 2004: 901). In 2001,
the party started to allow private entrepreneurs to join the party, and it also encouraged private
entrepreneurs to participate in civic and political affairs, including “community contribution,
participation in local people’s congresses, political consultative conferences, and local elections”
(Obukhova 2004: 902). Being coopted into the party-state and enjoying more benefits, the attitude
of these private entrepreneurs, “especially regarding their willingness to restrict political
participation to elites and to follow the lead of the state in political and especially economic reform,”
became “more in common with the neoconservative perspective prominent in some intellectual
circles in China than a liberal faith in participatory democracy” (Dickson 2003: 134). Moreover,
in 2004, the party-state amended the Chinese constitution and provided for the protection of private
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property. According to Article 13 of the amended constitution, citizen’s lawful private property is
“inviolable” (Zhang 2015).
Though being coopted by the party-state, the middle-class subgroup of private
entrepreneurs still faces a difficult business environment. The challenge is twofold. First, private
entrepreneurs have to pay the price for political corruption when dealing with the clientelistic ties
between them and government and party officials. Everything from the registration of a company
to the sale of commodities requires governmental approval. However, the approval or disapproval
of a business activity is not entirely based on laws and regulations, and there is room for rentseeking local officials to ask for bribes (Chen 2002: 415). As a result, small- and medium-scale
business owners share the same resentment against corruption with the subgroups of the middle
class that have no party or governmental background. Second, these private entrepreneurs need to
face the competition with red capitalists and SOEs. Without strong ties to the state like most
business elites have, these small- and medium-scale private entrepreneurs feel vulnerable in the
party-state-controlled market. Therefore, they support the idea of “institutionalization of and
ideological (or constitutional) justification for capitalism in order to make their business and
capitalist way of life politically safe” and “a system of checks and balances that could effectively
constrain party power over the market” (Chen 2002: 416). What they demand clearly resonates
with democratic values.
The interests of the private entrepreneurs are not aligned with those of the lower part of the
middle class, namely, white-collar employees, and the lower class in the Chinese society—workers
and farmers. Benefitting from the clientelistic ties with the government officials, private
entrepreneurs are able to maximize business profit with the help of a labor-repressive state power.
When exploitation and deteriorating working conditions cause capital-labor tensions, local
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governments usually choose to side with private entrepreneurs, share their profit, and ignore the
rights of the employees, who are underpaid or forced to work overtime (Chen 2002).
High income inequality in Chinese society also worries private entrepreneurs because it
may trigger a political movement or unpredictable change. The fear of revolution is deeply
engrained in these private entrepreneurs, and thus, they have reasons to back the authoritarian state
and prevent disruptive political change. However, most of these private entrepreneurs “have not
freed themselves from suspicions about the communist leadership’s commitment to capitalism”
(Chen 2002: 415). They still need the democratic rule of law and confined state power to prevent
the recurrence of what happened to their predecessors in the 1950s.

3. Professionals
The middle-class subgroup of professionals includes professionals in both public sector and private
sector of the economy. Most professionals in the public sector are dependent on the state for their
income. As highly educated people, professionals are more prone to democratic values, and, as a
result, they are usually supervised by the state through their affiliated public agencies—such as
universities, public hospitals, research institutions, or trade associations—such as the China
Writers Association and the All China Lawyers Association.
The state makes efforts to coopt professionals, especially professionals in the public sector.
While professionals in the private sector obtain wealth in the market-based economy, those in the
public sector mainly depend on government commission and experienced a surge of income in the
late 1990s. For example, the salaries of professionals in the healthcare sector in Beijing raised by
168 percent during 1995 and 2000, and their average salary increased on average to 40 percent
above the average salary. In the same time period, professionals in tertiary education and scientific
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institutions experienced an increase in salary by 158 percent, and their average salary went from
below average to 31 percent above the average salary (Tomba 2009: 3). Apart from expanded
income, professionals in the public sector also received other benefits, including education, welfare,
and housing. Moreover, the state also hands out a special government stipend, and recruits
professionals into the party or promotes them to senior government positions.
Professionals’ experience of upward economic mobility is accompanied by an elevated
social status. In traditional Chinese society, intellectuals were venerated by the public. However,
in the chaotic Mao era, intellectuals were seen as members of “class enemies” and “bourgeois
reactionaries,” named the “Stinking Ninth” 1 (Facts and Details 2019), and systematically
persecuted. During the first two decades of economic reform era, when the economy took off,
these professionals’ income was left behind, and they were seen as “perennial under-achievers.”
The sudden economic elevation helped professionals to assume a much higher social status. These
uplifting changes, along with other perks due to the state’s cooptation strategy, successfully tamed
politically most of these professionals. Those professionals who cannot be coopted were purged.
For example, according to the regulations of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Academy
scholars “must adhere to the guiding role of Marxism in philosophical and social science research,
and may not publicly proclaim views which oppose or violate the fundamental theory, direction,
or platform of the Party.” Scholars who violated the regulation were dismissed from their positions
(Human Rights in China 2009).
Thus, the middle-class subgroup of professionals, which is usually the “forces of
democratization,” is neutralized by state’s cooptation and purges. Some of the professionals may

1

Mao Zedong distinguishes nine categories of enemies during the Cultural Revolution, including landlords, rich
peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, rightists, traitor, foreign agents, capitalist roaders, and intellectuals.
The name comes from intellectuals’ ninth ranking on the list (Facts and Details 2019).
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strive for democratic political change, but most of them are satisfied with the benefits that they
obtain from the authoritarian status quo and have learned from past political movements and recent
“lessons” to live under the rule of the party.

4. White-Collar Employees
White-collar employees are the lower part of the Chinese middle class. This subgroup of the
Chinese middle class grew rapidly along with the expansion of the private sector in the 1990s.
White-collar employees are mostly college educated and were once an exemplary group of the
Chinese middle class in the 1990s and early 2000s, representing the China’s version of the “middle
class dream” (Chan 2010). A college degree used to be a ticket to middle-class status. However,
after the expansion of university enrollment in 1996, there was a massive glut of college graduates.
An excessive supply of college graduates, the aftereffects of the global financial crisis, and the
slowdown of the Chinese economy all negatively affect the employment prospect of these whitecollar employees. They are forced to take jobs with a lower salary. Some of these white-collar
employees are struggling on the edge of being middle class, and others have already stepped down
from the middle-class status, earning less than blue-collar employees (Chan 2010).
The middle-class subgroup of white-collar employees is facing multiple challenges. Rising
property prices, poor salaries, limited promotion opportunities, and poor health conditions due to
heavy workload are among reasons for their anxiety (Wang 2017). According to a Cision report
(2018), about 45.1 percent of white-collar employees rented apartments, and 22.2 percent of them
bought condominiums with mortgages. About 70 percent of white-collar employees were not
satisfied with their salaries and believed that their current salaries did not match their skills. More
than 90 percent of white-collar employees experienced anxiety often or occasionally.
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Moreover, as the lower part of the middle class, white-collar employees do not enjoy
privileges available to other subgroups, and their rights are also not properly protected by the state,
which creates tensions between white-collar employees and other subgroups of the middle and
upper class. The most telling example is the infamous “996” work schedule. In recent years, more
companies in China started to expect white-collar employees to work “from nine in the morning
to nine in the evening, six days a week” (Hruby 2018). Those employees who opposed the 12-hour
workaday were dismissed by companies. Making employees work overtime is against the labor
law in China, but private businesses were not punished by law because of the acquiescence of the
state. In terms of the “996” work schedule, the response from government officials was that
companies should have employees’ consent for working overtime, and that if employees believe
companies’ work schedules are against the law, they have the right to file a complaint (Zhao 2019).
However, in reality, filing a complaint against the company means certain dismissal. White-collar
employees can rarely afford the cost.
Facing deteriorating job market, financial burdens, and exploitation by private
entrepreneurs, the middle-class subgroup of white-collar employees have enough reason for
supporting a more democratic system that can effectively protect their rights and well-being. With
their education background, these white-collar employees are tech-savvy, speak foreign languages,
and thus, are more likely to embrace democratic values. In addition, they are also familiar with the
internet and social media. As a result, they can pose a threat to the authoritarian rule of the party
if they are organized around a common cause.
Based on the above analysis of different subgroups of the Chinese middle class, it is clear
that these various subgroups have different interests that create divisions and tensions. Therefore,
although these subgroups all share certain degree of democratic orientation, the fragmented
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structure of the Chinese middle class prevents reaching a consensus on democratic change. The
more privileged subgroups, such as government officials and party cadres and some private
entrepreneurs and professionals, are benefitting from the current order and remain satisfied with
the authoritarian status quo. The lower part of the middle class can only cope with the tensions
between themselves and privileged subgroups. There is little common ground for joining forces
and reaching a political consensus. The fragmented Chinese middle class is also the product of the
party-state’s cooptation.
With no cohesion in the class structure, the Chinese middle class is not likely, for the time
being, to become a force of democratic change. Furthermore, the more privileged subgroups that
are more dependent on the state are the ones with more social influence and resources. As a result,
their attitude toward a potential democratic change is crucial to the formation of a middle-class
consensus. If the lower part of the middle class could receive support from the more privileged
part of the middle class, a consensus on democratization might be reached, and a democratic
change could be possible.
To prevent such a consensus from being reached, the state handles the Chinese middle class
through ways more than cooptation. First, the state tightens its social surveillance and control over
media. Economic development has equipped the state with the revenue to fund “expanded and
upgraded police efforts (including monitoring and censorship of the internet)” (Pei 2007: 55).
Moreover, the state also introduces a “social credit” system, which not only records citizens’
financial credit but also documents their “good deeds” and puts some citizens on a “blacklist”
based on their misconduct. The citizens’ social credit score can directly affect their financial and
employment opportunities, and it is also linked to their access to public service (Zeng 2018). This
measure can be used to punish citizens who do not cooperate with the state. Second, the state uses
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its propaganda machine to discredit democracy as a feasible political system for China. The state
promotes media coverage of democratic movements in other countries, which are portraited as
chaotic and dangerous, so that the Chinese middle class and other parts of the society “associate
democracy with political chaos, economic breakdown, the mafia, and other social evils” (Chen
2002: 414). And last, when propaganda and surveillance are not effective, the state can resort to
political retribution to deter any challenge posed by middle-class individual. For example, to
protect their rights, members of the middle class are more likely to choose a legal solution.
However, by suing government officials, these individuals might face “inconvenience or trouble
in their future relationship with the government” (Tang 2011: 384). More progressive actions such
as protesting can be framed as “subversion” and then be repressed.
Under the pressure of state control, the middle class’ voice is muffled, and an alliance
among different subgroups is elusive because the censored media cannot provide a forum for these
groups. Consequently, the gaps between these fragmented middle-class subgroups has deepened.
The party-state’s unconstrained power can negatively affect the interests of the middle class as a
whole, privileged and unprivileged members alike. With its lack of confidence in the state and the
future of the country, and even fear of the possible collapse of China, many middle class members,
along with some members of the upper class, have left the country. They seek to migrate to more
developed democratic countries, such as the United State, Canada, the European Union, Australia,
and New Zealand (Sohu 2018), where they believe their private property will be protected. This
trend caused capital outflows that concern the state because of their negative impact on the Chinese
economy. Some government officials even became so-called “naked officials,” those who “send
their families overseas allegedly with their ill-gotten assets” (Li 2014).
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When Is Democracy Preferred?
If the argument in this study holds, then the Chinese middle class does have an intrinsic desire and
need for a more democratic political system. However, it has not been able to act because of the
fragmentation of the class and the deep tensions among its subgroups. The strategic handling of
the middle class by the party-state only deepens the fragmentation. At this point, there is a question
that needs to be asked: when will democratization become the preferred future for the Chinese
middle class as a whole? By taking a look at the China of 1989 and the China of 2019, and
analyzing the political, economic, and social conditions in these two eras, the answer is clear: the
various Chinese middle-class subgroups need to somehow form a cohesive force around a common
cause, and the subgroups of the middle class dependent on the state need to support the potential
democratic change.
A pro-democratic movement happened in the China of 1989. In the 1989 Chinese society,
the social groups that can be construed as middle class were government officials and party cadres,
professionals, and small-scale businesspeople. At that time, the salaries of government officials,
party cadres, and professionals were not significantly higher than other urban social groups.
Income inequality among the Chinese middle class was not pronounced. Moreover, the economic
reform was still at its initial stage, and thus the tensions between owners of private business and
their employees were not marked. In the 1980s, there was a liberalization in the Chinese urban
society, and intellectuals and urban citizens were both exposed to some democratic values.
Furthermore, after ten years of political terror during the Cultural Revolution, the party
implemented a more relaxed political attitude. As a result, when the resentment toward the
profiteering of the offspring of government and party officials fermented in the Chinese society
and was expressed by the university students—a considerable amount of which were from middle
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class families, the middle class supported the movement. In Beijing, many urban citizens joined
the student protest and provided food and transportation for students. But the repression of the
state was fast and furious.
There are many possible reasons for the failure of the 1989 pro-democratic movement.
Some scholars believe that the university students failed to engage workers and farmers to form
an alliance; some argue that the students wanted to be coopted by the state and were not determined
to support democracy; and still other contend that the reason might be the lack of a Chinese civil
society or the party’s determination to suppress dissent.
This study contends that one other reason might be the fear of instability of the middle
class as a whole. After a decade of devastating political movement, the Chinese middle class only
had a brief taste of economic development and a relatively peaceful political life. Although most
of them hoped for democratic change, their memory of the past horror was still fresh. They were
not ready for a political upheaval that could possibly send the country back to chaos. Therefore,
their support for democracy was halting, tentative, and weak.
In the China of 2019, there no national democratic movement in spite of high income
inequality, rampant corruption, economic slowdown, many social grievances, and a tightening
political control of the party. The economic development and the party’s cooptation strategy both
deepen the fragmentation of the Chinese middle class, and it is difficult for various subgroups of
the middle class to reach a consensus on democratization because they have different interests and
fears. In addition, economic growth has equipped the state with more powerful tools for social
control.
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IV. CONCLUSION
After four decades of economic and social development, Chinese society has undergone significant
changes, and the Chinese, including the middle class, have grown with the country as they have
lived through different stages of economic development. The absence of democracy in today’s
China is more than just a puzzle, but, in fact, an embodiment of the contradictory nature of the
country: a fasting-growing middle class, benefitting both from the capitalist economy and the
authoritarian political system, but composed of fragmented subgroups, all harboring nervousness
about politics. Division stymies political engagement. Only when a consensus among the many
middle-class subgroups is achieved will there be a possibility for a democratic China.
Certain scenarios could lead to a middle-class consensus. First, China’s immense income
inequality could lead the lower part of the middle class to protest. The privileged part of the
Chinese society, including the upper part of the middle class, might be forced into a consensus
because of the lower middle class’ large size and its strong ties with rural China (a significant
number of white-collar employees are from rural families). Second, unexpected events, such as a
natural disaster or a catastrophic accident, might exposed the party-state’s weaknesses and
potentially threaten the interests of the privileged subgroups of the middle class. Then a middleclass consensus might be reached. Finally, the mishandling of the middle class by the party might
lead to a middle-class consensus. For example, the party’s austerity program might hurt the
interests and undermine the loyalty of the privileged subgroups of the middle class, leading them
to form a coalition with less fortunate members of the middle class.
In the globalized era, the well-to-do Chinese middle class could choose in increasingly
large numbers to leave authoritarian China and to migrate to democratic countries. Migration can
be perceived as an individual solution to a collective problem. By escaping from the authoritarian
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system, middle-class individuals can finally embrace the democratic values and rights that they
desire. For the state, migration is a safety valve. Despite the negative impact of wealthy Chinese
citizens’ migration abroad on the Chinese economy, middle-class citizens who are more likely to
support democratic change leave China through migration, which indirectly takes pressure off the
state. If the Chinese middle class did not have such a choice of moving to other countries, they
might be more willing to support democratic change in China.
The theoretical implication of this study is threefold. First, it is theoretically beneficial to
study the middle class as an actor in democratization. As units that depict the dynamics of social
stratification during social and economic advancement, social classes summarize various social
groups’ positions in a given society and outline the characteristics of groups that share more or
less common backgrounds, income levels, political interests, and lifestyle. The middle class, as
described by Lipset and many other scholars, possess a natural tendency toward democracy. With
the general understanding of the middle class and a grasp of its overall political interests, scholars
can develop theories that more concisely explain political phenomena in a given society.
Second, although displaying common socioeconomic characteristics and certain shared
values, the middle class is not a monolithic entity, and, consequently, not a monolithic political
actor. Scholars have long observed the fluidity and inconsistency of the middle-class political
attitude toward democratic change, which can partly be explained by its fragmentation or lack of
coherence. Each subgroup of the middle class is facing a unique social, economic, and political
context, and they react differently to various conditions. As a result, the middle class not only
needs to be carefully defined as a social group, but also needs to be discreetly disaggregated.
Instead of using the middle class as a “catch-all” expression, and studying it as a homogeneous
entity, it is more effective to distinguish subgroups of the middle class, analyze their interests, and
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reach explanations for political behavior based on their complexity and fragmentation. Moreover,
it is also important to take into account the state’s sensitivity to these cleavages, and its capacity
to exploit conflicts among the middle-class subgroups.
Third, new circumstances have emerged during recent economic development and
globalization. One example is middle class’ migration to democratic countries to escape
authoritarian rule, which disrupts the middle class’ support for democratic change. Another
example is the closer tie between urban white-collar employees and the rural population because
of both internal migration and the expansion of higher education, which also affects the middle
class’ political attitude and the state’s strategy of managing the middle class. In the era of Lipset
and the development of the modernization theory, scholars did not foresee the emergence of these
new circumstances. Theory should always be grounded in empirical realities—and the world is
forever changing.
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